


















Pre- and Post-selection paradoxes and contextuality in quantum mechanics
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Many seemingly paradoxical effects are known in the predictions for outcomes of intermediate
measurements made on pre- and post-selected quantum systems. Despite appearances, these ef-
fects do not demonstrate the impossibility of a noncontextual hidden variable theory, since an
explanation in terms of measurement-disturbance is possible. Nonetheless, we show that for every
paradoxical effect wherein all the pre- and post- selected probabilities are 0 or 1 and the pre- and
post-selected states are nonorthogonal, there is an associated proof of contextuality. This proof is
obtained by considering all the measurements involved in the paradoxical effect – the pre-selection,
the post-selection, and the alternative possible intermediate measurements – as alternative possible
measurements at a single time.
PACS numbers: 03.65.Ta
The study of quantum systems that are both pre- and
post-selected was initiated by Aharonov, Bergmann and
Lebowitz (ABL) in 1964 [1], and has led to the discovery
of many counter-intuitive results, which we refer to as
pre- and post-selection (PPS) effects [2], some of which
have recently been confirmed experimentally [3].
These results have led to a long debate about the in-
terpretation of the ABL probability rule [4]. An under-
current in this debate has been the connection between
PPS effects and contextuality. For instance, Bub and
Brown [5] understood the paper of Albert, Aharonov and
D’Amato [6] – which concerned a PPS effect known since
as the “3-box paradox” – as a claim to a novel proof of
contextuality, that is, as a version of the Bell-Kochen-
Specker theorem [7, 8], and convincingly disputed this
claim. Although the language of Ref. [6] does suggest
such a reading, in Ref. [9] the authors clarified their po-
sition, stating that it was not their intention to conclude
anything about hidden variable theories. Nonetheless,
discussions of PPS paradoxes, that is, PPS effects of the
3-box paradox variety, continue to make use of a language
that suggests implications for ontology [10] and the claim
that certain PPS paradoxes are proofs of contextuality
can be found in the literature [11]. Although we agree
with Bub and Brown that this claim is mistaken, we show
that there is nonetheless a close connection between the
two phenomena.
This connection is expected to have interesting ap-
plications in quantum foundational studies. For in-
stance, it has been suggested by some that Bell’s theorem
[12] might be understood within a realist and Lorentz-
invariant framework if one admits the possibility of a
hidden variable theory that allows for backward-in-time
causation [13]. A simple model has even been suggested
by Kent [14]. The latter is closely connected to the fact
that Bell correlations can be simulated using postselec-
tion, as shown in Bub and Brown [5]. This simulation by
postselection is also the root of the detection-efficiency
loophole in experimental tests of Bell’s theorem [15, 16].
Further investigations into the connection between proofs
of nonlocality and PPS paradoxes would shed new light
on these avenues of research. As nonlocality is a kind
of contextuality (assuming separability [17]), the ubiq-
uitous connection between contextuality and PPS para-
doxes established in the present work is an important
contribution to this project. Moreover, the fact that the
phenomenon of contextuality itself might be understood
by abandoning the traditional notion of causality, and the
fact that its simulation by postselection will likely con-
stitute a loophole for experimental tests of contextuality,
makes this connection interesting in its own right.
Mermin [18] has already shown one connection between
PPS effects and contextuality. His investigation con-
cerned what is known as the “mean king’s problem” [19]
which is a PPS effect that is qualitatively different from
the paradoxical variety of PPS effect that we shall be con-
sidering. Moreover, Mermin demonstrated how one can
obtain a type of mean king’s problem that is unsolvable
starting from the measurements used in a proof of con-
textuality, whereas we demonstrate how one can obtain
proofs of contextuality starting from the measurements
used in a PPS paradox.
To be specific, we demonstrate the following: for every
PPS paradox wherein all the PPS probabilities are 0 or 1
and the pre- and post-selection states are non-orthogonal,
there is an associated proof of contextuality. The key
to the proof is that measurements that are treated as
temporal successors in the PPS paradox are treated as
counterfactual alternatives in the proof of contextuality.
This result suggests the existence of a subtle conceptual
connection between the two phenomena that has yet to
be fully understood. Thus, the present work contributes
to the project of reducing the number of logically distinct
quantum mysteries by revealing the connections between
them.
We begin with a curious prediction of the ABL rule
known as the 3-box paradox. Suppose we have a particle
that can be in one of three boxes. We denote the state
where the particle is in box j by |j〉. The particle is
pre-selected in the state |φ〉 = |1〉 + |2〉 + |3〉 and post-
2selected in the state |ψ〉 = |1〉 + |2〉 − |3〉 (states will be
left unnormalized). At an intermediate time, one of two
possible measurements is performed. The first possibility
corresponds to the projector valued measure (PVM) [32]
E1 = {P1, P
⊥
1 }, where
P1 = |1〉 〈1| P
⊥
1 = |2〉 〈2|+ |3〉 〈3| . (1)




P2 = |2〉 〈2| P
⊥
2 = |1〉 〈1|+ |3〉 〈3| (2)
Now note that P⊥1 can also be decomposed into a sum
of the projectors onto the vectors |2〉 + |3〉 and |2〉 −
|3〉. However, the first of these is orthogonal to the post-
selected state, while the second is orthogonal to the pre-
selected state, so that the probability of the outcome P⊥1
occurring, given that the pre- and post-selection were
successful, must be 0. Consequently, the measurement of
E1 necessarily has the outcome P1. Similarly, P
⊥
2 can be
decomposed into a sum of the projectors onto the vectors
|1〉 + |3〉 and |1〉 − |3〉, which are also orthogonal to the
post- and pre-selected states respectively. Consequently,
the measurement of E2 necessarily has the outcome P2.
Thus, if one measures to see whether or not the particle
was in box 1, one finds that it was in box 1 with certainty,
and if one measures to see whether or not it was in box
2, one finds that it was in box 2 with certainty!
This is reminiscent of the sort of conclusion that one
obtains in proofs of the impossibility of a noncontextual
hidden variable theory. Indeed, a proof presented by
Clifton [20] makes use of the same mathematical struc-
ture, as we presently demonstrate.
Consider the eight vectors mentioned explicitly in our
discussion of the 3-box paradox, but imagine that these
describe alternative possible measurements at a single
time (in contrast to what occurs in the 3-box paradox).
In a noncontextual hidden variable theory, it is presumed
that although not all of these tests can be implemented si-
multaneously, their outcomes are determined by the val-
ues of preexisting hidden variables and are independent
of the manner in which the test is made (the context).
Thus each of these vectors is assigned a value, 1 or 0,
specifying whether the associated test is passed or not.
For any orthogonal pair, not both can receive the value
1, and for any orthogonal triplet, exactly one must re-
ceive the value 1. Representing the vectors by points and
orthogonality between vectors by a line between points,
these eight vectors above can be depicted as in Fig. 1.
Clifton’s proof is an example of a probablistic proof of
contextuality [21], since it relies on assigning the states
|φ〉 , |ψ〉 probability 1 a priori. This is justified as fol-
lows: the state |φ〉 can be prepared, and if it is, then a
subsequent test for |φ〉 will be passed with certainty, and
a subsequent test for |ψ〉 will be passed with nonzero
probability (because 〈ψ| φ〉 6= 0). This implies that there
must be some values of the hidden variables that assign
value 1 to both. Consider such a hidden state. Since
|1〉− |3〉 and |2〉− |3〉 are orthogonal to |ψ〉, they must be
assigned value 0 for this hidden state and since |1〉+ |3〉
and |2〉+ |3〉 are orthogonal to |φ〉, they must also be as-
signed value 0. But given that |1〉, |2〉+ |3〉, and |2〉− |3〉
form an orthogonal triplet, it follows that |1〉 must re-
ceive the value 1. Similarly, given that |2〉, |1〉 + |3〉,
and |1〉 − |3〉 form an orthogonal triplet, it follows that
|2〉 must receive the value 1. However, |1〉 and |2〉 can-
not both receive the value 1, since they are orthogonal.
Thus, we have derived a contradiction.
To our knowledge, the connection between Clifton’s
proof and the 3-box paradox has not previously been rec-
ognized.
FIG. 1: A depiction of the vectors in Clifton’s proof of con-
textuality and their orthogonality relations. An assignment
of the value 1 or 0 to a vector is represented by colouring the
associated point white or black respectively.
We will demonstrate that this sort of connection is
generic to PPS paradoxes. We begin with a short review
of the ABL rule, hidden variable theories and contextu-
ality.
We only consider quantum systems with a finite di-
mensional Hilbert space and assume that no evolution
occurs between measurements. We restrict our attention
to sharp measurements, that is, those associated with
PVMs. We also restrict attention to measurements for
which the state updates according to ρ→ PjρPj/Tr(Pjρ)
upon obtaining outcome j. This is known as the Lu¨ders
rule [22]. We call this set of assumptions the standard
framework for PPS effects. It includes all of the PPS
“paradoxes” discussed in the literature to date. The ex-
tent to which our results can be generalized beyond this
framework is a question for future research.
To describe pre- and post-selected systems, we imagine
a temporal sequence of three sharp measurements. The
initial, intermediate, and final measurements occur at
times tpre, t, and tpost respectively, where tpre < t < tpost.
The only relevant aspects of the initial and final PVMs
are the projectors associated with the outcomes speci-
fied by the pre- and post-selection. Let these be denoted
by Πpre and Πpost respectively, and let the PVM associ-
ated with the intermediate measurement be denoted by
E = {Pj}.
Assuming that nothing is known about the system
prior to tpre, so that the initial density operator is I/d,
3where I is the identity operator, the measurement at tpre
prepares the density operator ρpre = Πpre/Tr(Πpre). By
Bayes’ theorem, we can deduce that the probability of ob-






This is a special case of the most general version of the
ABL rule [2], and we therefore refer to such probabilities
as “ABL probabilities”. In the case where Πpre and Πpost
are rank-1 projectors onto states |φ〉 and |ψ〉 respectively,
this rule reduces to
p(Pk|φ, ψ, E) =
| 〈ψ|Pk |φ〉 |
2
∑
j | 〈ψ|Pj |φ〉 |
2
(3)
which was implicitly used in our discussion of the 3-box
paradox. We now review hidden variable theories.
A hidden variable theory is an attempt to under-
stand quantum measurements as revealing features of
pre-existing ontic states, by which we mean complete
specifications of the state of reality. A particularly natu-
ral class of such theories are those that satisfy the follow-
ing two assumptions [17]: measurement noncontextuality,
which is the assumption that the manner in which the
measurement is represented in the HVT depends only
on the PVM and not on any other details of the mea-
surement (the context); and outcome determinism for
sharp measurements, which is the assumption that the
outcome of a PVM measurement is uniquely fixed by the
ontic state. We abbreviate these as MNHVTs. It fol-
lows that in an MNHVT, projectors are associated with
unique pre-existing properties that are simply revealed
by measurements [17].
Suppose we denote by s the proposition that asserts
that the property associated with projector P is pos-
sessed. In an MNHVT the negation of s, denoted ¬s,
is associated with I − P. Now consider a projector Q
that commutes with P, and denote the proposition as-
sociated with Q by t. In an MNHVT the conjunction of
s and t, denoted s ∧ t, is associated with PQ and the
disjunction of s and t, denoted s ∨ t, is associated with
P + Q − PQ (the latter follows from the the fact that
s ∨ t = ¬(¬s ∧ ¬t)).
Let p(s) denote the probability that the proposition s
is true. Classical probability theory dictates that
0 ≤ p(s) ≤ 1 (4)
p(¬s) = 1− p(s), (5)
p(s ∨ ¬s) = 1, p(s ∧ ¬s) = 0 (6)
p(s ∧ t) ≤ p(s), p(s ∧ t) ≤ p(t) (7)
p(s ∨ t) = p(s) + p(t)− p(s ∧ t) (8)
We therefore obtain the following constraints on an MN-
HVT.
Algebraic conditions: For projectors P,Q such that
[P,Q] = 0,
0 ≤ p(P ) ≤ 1 (9)
p(I − P ) = 1− p(P ), (10)
p(I) = 1, p(0) = 0, (11)
p(PQ) ≤ p(P ), p(PQ) ≤ p(Q), (12)
p(P +Q− PQ) = p(P ) + p(Q)− p(PQ). (13)
By the assumption of outcome determinism, the prob-
ability assigned to every projector for a particular ontic
state is either 0 or 1. The Bell-Kochen-Specker theo-
rem shows that there are sets of projectors to which no
such assignment consistent with the algebraic conditions
is possible.
A connection to PPS paradoxes is suggested by the
fact that there exist sets of projectors for which an ABL
probability assignment violates the algebraic constraints,
while every projector receives probability 0 or 1. We call
such a scenario a logical PPS paradox. The 3-box paradox
is an example of this [33].
Now, if it were the case that in the HVT, the pre-
and post-selection picked out a set of ontic states that
was independent of the nature of the intermediate mea-
surement, then the probability assigned by the ABL rule
to a projector could also be interpreted as the probabil-
ity assigned to it by these ontic states. But since the
latter probabilities are required to satisfy the algebraic
conditions in a MNHVT, the violation of these condi-
tions would be a proof of contextuality. However, the
set of ontic states picked out by the PPS need not be
independent of the nature of the intermediate measure-
ment in general. To see this, note that a measurement
in an HVT need not be modelled simply by a Bayesian
updating of one’s information, but may also lead to a
disturbance of the ontic state, and the nature of this dis-
turbance may depend on the nature of the intermediate
measurement. Consequently, a PPS paradox is not itself
a proof of contextuality. This is discussed in more detail
in Ref. [23].
Despite these considerations, the main aim of this let-
ter is to show that there is a connection between PPS
paradoxes and contextuality, but it is significantly more
subtle than one might have thought.
Theorem. For every logical PPS paradox within the
standard framework for which the pre- and post-selection
projectors are non-orthogonal, there is an associated
proof of the impossibility of an MNHVT that is ob-
tained by considering all the measurements defined by the
PPS paradox – the pre-selection measurement, the post-
selection measurement and the alternative possible inter-
mediate measurements – as alternative possible measure-
ments at a single time.
Our proof of this theorem generalizes the argument
4presented for the 3-box paradox. We begin with two
lemmas and a corollary.
Lemma 1. If Πpre, Πpost, P are projectors satisfying
Πpost(I − P )Πpre = 0, then there exists a pair of orthog-
onal projectors Q and R such that I − P = Q+R where
ΠpreR = 0 and ΠpostQ = 0.
Proof. Let R ≡ (I−P )∧(I−Πpre), where P ∧Q denotes
the projector onto the intersection of the subspaces as-
sociated with P and Q. This clearly satisfies ΠpreR = 0.
Moreover, since R is a subspace of I − P , the projector
Q ≡ (I −P )−R is orthogonal to R and satisfies I −P =
Q+R. Finally, Πpost(I−P )Πpre = 0 entails that Πpost is
orthogonal to the projector onto ran((I − P )ran(Πpre)),
where ran(X) denotes the range of X . But this projec-
tor is simply (I − P )− (I − P ) ∧ (I −Πpre) = Q. Thus,
ΠpostQ = 0 is satisfied.
Lemma 2. If under a pre-selection of Πpre and a post-
selection of Πpost, the projector P receives probability 1
in a measurement of some PVM E, then in an MNHVT,
if Πpre and Πpost are assigned probability 1 by some ontic
state λ, P is also assigned probability 1 by the ontic state
λ. Succintly, if p(P |Πpre,Πpost, E) = 1 and p(Πpre|λ) =
p(Πpost|λ) = 1, then p(P |λ) = 1.
Proof. If p(P |Πpre,Πpost, E) = 1, then by the ABL rule
Tr(ΠprePΠpostP )
Tr(ΠprePΠpostP ) + Tr(Πpre(I − P )Π post(I − P ))
= 1
which implies that Tr(Πpre(I−P )Πpost(I−P )) = 0, and
since Tr(A†A) = 0 implies that A = 0, it follows that
Πpost(I−P )Πpre = 0. It then follows from lemma 1, that
I−P can be decomposed into a sum of projectors R and
Q which are orthogonal to Πpre and Πpost respectively.
Given this orthogonality, for any λ in an MNHVT that
yields p(Πpre|λ) = 1, and p(Πpost|λ), we have p(Q|λ) =
p(R|λ) = 0. It then follows from the algebraic conditions
that p(P |λ) = 1 − p(I − P |λ) = 1 − p(Q + R|λ) = 1 −
p(Q|λ)− p(R|λ) = 1.
Corollary. If p(P |Πpre,Πpost, E) = 0 and p(Πpre|λ) =
p(Πpost|λ) = 1, then p(P |λ) = 0.
Proof. p(P |Πpre,Πpost, E) = 0 implies p(I −
P |Πpre,Πpost, E) = 1, which by lemma 2 implies
p(I − P |λ) = 1. It then follows from the algebraic
constraints that p(P |λ) = 0.
Proof of theorem. By the assumption that the PPS pro-
jectors are nonorthogonal, there exist ontic states λ such
that p(Πpre|λ) = p(Π post|λ) = 1. This, together with
lemma 2 and its corollary, implies that whatever prob-
ability assignments to {P} arise from the ABL rule
also arise in any MNHVT as the probability assignment
to {P} for those ontic states λ yielding p(Πpre|λ) =
p(Πpost|λ) = 1. Since, by the assumption of a logical
PPS paradox, the ABL probabilities violate the algebraic
conditions, it follows that the probabilities conditioned
on this λ in an MNHVT also violate the algebraic condi-
tions. However, probability assignments in an MNHVT
must satisfy these conditions, therefore an MNHVT is
ruled out.
A question that has not been addressed in the present
paper is whether the existence of logical PPS paradoxes
in a theory implies measurement contextuality. To an-
swer this question, one must characterize each of these
features in a theory-independent manner, and examine
whether every theory that exhibits the former also ex-
hibits the latter. For an attempt to provide an oper-
ational characterization of contextuality, see [17]. No
attempt at providing an operational characterization of
logical PPS paradoxes has yet been made, but in [24],
Kirkpatrick has proposed an analogue of the 3-box para-
dox in the context of a model with playing cards [25],
and we have proposed a similar analogue in the context
of a simple partitioned-box model in [23]. These models
are measurement noncontextual by the definition of [17].
Thus if one agrees that either the 3-box paradox of Kirk-
patrick or that of [23] is indeed a logical PPS paradox,
then one can conclude that logical PPS paradoxes do not
imply contextuality.
Nonetheless, the toy theory of [26], which is in many
respects more similar to quantum theory than the mod-
els of [25] or [23], seems unable to reproduce the logical
PPS paradoxes. Moreover, one of the most conspicu-
ous phenomena that this toy theory fails to reproduce is
contextuality (where again we appeal to the operational
definition of contextuality provided in [17]). All of this
suggests that there may be a natural set of conditions
that quantum theory, classical probability theory with
Bayesian updating and the toy theory of [26] satisfy, but
that Kirkpatrick’s model and the partitioned box model
of [23] do not satisfy, under which logical PPS paradoxes
can only arise if there is contextuality. Further investi-
gations into these issues are required.
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